

Auburn University

Auburn University, Alabama 36849-5207

History Department
7030 Haley Center

11 September 1991

Telephone: (205) 844-4360
ATTNet: 221-4360

Professor Joshua Lederberg
The Rockefeller University
New York, New York 10021-6399

Dear Professor Lederberg:

Thank you for your kind remarks about my article in the 1986 volume of Defense Analysis. I have received a number of complimentary comments about it, which is somewhat surprising since "Preparing for What Never Came" was my first and only effort in the area of chemical and biological warfare. I became interested in the subject in response to a student's question: "Why didn't the warring powers use chemical gas in World War II as they had in World War I." Every step I took to find an answer for this student led me deeper into the subject and eventually resulted in this article. I truly enjoyed researching and writing it, because so much of what is in it is not well known and because it is one of the few examples in world history where societies developed weapons and then decided not to use them.

You asked for copies of the reports cited in note 5, including intelligence reports from the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I'm sorry but I did not make copies of any of these when I examined them in the National Archives, relying instead on index card notes taken from them. If they are of special interest to you, you may try writing the National Archives in Washington directly. Usually the staff there is willing to provide photocopies or microfilm of specific report citations for a small fee.

You also asked if I have published further on this subject. I'm sorry to say I have not, for two reasons. First, the logical follow-up topic for this work would have been a study of American chemical and biological development during the period of the Cold War, but I immediately ran up against national security restrictions. I tried for nearly a year to pursue this study, but was unable to gather sufficient documentary sources to make further efforts profitable. I filed a number of Freedom of Information Act requests, largely without success. The major problem was that you have to be able to describe the records you want released under the Freedom of Information Act, but I was never able to discover sufficient information to even describe the records I needed. A great deal of the information available

⑧ ↓
BW
o ↓
HCF

in any case remained under strict security classification restrictions.

Second, I am primarily an air power historian. As you may have noticed, there is a significant slant toward chemical and biological aerial weapons in "Preparing for What Never Came." The reason I was unable to pursue chemical and biological weapons research further was that another project intruded into the few hours available to me for research and writing. I recently completed this effort in a book entitled To Command the Sky: The Struggle for Air Superiority over Germany, 1942-1944, published by the Smithsonian Press.

Concerning Hinsley's volumes on British intelligence, to my knowledge no other volumes have appeared. We still await a history of the role of ULTRA in American strategy. A recent volume comes close, but is remarkably thin in comparison to the Hinsley volumes. The book I refer to is an interview with Supreme Court Justice Powell about his experiences in World War II working with the ULTRA/ENIGMA project and published by the Office of Air Force History.

I wish I had the time to continue research in this area, because it is truly a fascinating one, especially given the recent troubles in the Middle East. My original area of historical concentration was the Middle East, making Iraq's chemical and biological programs of special interest to me. Unfortunately, again, time does not permit. I am currently researching and writing a book manuscript on the development of the Norden bombsight and the doctrine of daylight precision strategic bombing in the United States. I have always been fascinated that the United States, alone among the nations of the world, developed a "war-winning" doctrine based on destroying the machines of war rather than simply killing people, sticking to it in World War II despite many obstacles. I intend for this book to be not only a technological and military history, but moreover a social history of the American people and their unique commitment to waging total war with a minimum of civilian casualties.

I know most of what I have written so far is not exactly what you wanted to hear, but I do have at least one affirmative answer to pass on to you. One of the few documents I discovered in the USAF archives and was able to have declassified under the procedures of the Freedom of Information Act was a rather fascinating study of Air Force involvement in biological warfare written for the Air Materiel Command in 1952 by Dorothy L. Miller. Despite a TOP SECRET classification, I was able to secure the release of one hundred pages of this study, though without citations and without some details. In any case, I have photocopied the study for you and have enclosed it. It is your

copy, so please do not feel the need to return it. Also, please do not attempt to compensate me for the expense. If you find it informative and of use, then that is payment enough. Unfortunately this study only runs through 1952 and therefore includes nothing on biological warfare developments during the height of the Cold War. I apologize for the red marks. Understand that they are mine and are not a part of the original document.

Again, many thanks for the compliments, which are especially flattering coming from a scholar of your stature. If I may be of further assistance, please feel free to call or write.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Stephen L. McFarland', written in a cursive style.

Stephen L. McFarland
Associate Professor of History